



表2 第三者評価における DAC5 項目および数値評価 (1999 年度-2000 年度)

(%以外は評価件数)

DAC5 項目の使用		(%)	DAC5 項目	各項目使用	(%)	数値評価	(%)
使用	13	34.2	効率性	11	85	3	27
			目標達成度	13	100	4	31
			インパクト	13	100	3	23
			妥当性	12	92	3	25
			持続性	13	100	3	23
不使用	25	65.8	効率性	0	0	—	—
			目標達成度	6	24	4	67
			インパクト	3	12	3	100
			妥当性	2	8	0	0
			持続性	4	16	2	50

(注) 1. 5 項目のうち 4 項目以上使用しているものを「使用」、それ以外を「不使用」とした。

2. DAC5 項目を使用した（しなかった）うち、各項目を使用した事業評価数の割合。

3. DAC 各 5 項目を使用したうち、数値評価を行った事業評価数の割合。

(出所)松岡・本田(2001)

表3 ODA 評価における第3者評価 (1999 年度-2000 年度)

		外務省		JICA		JBIC(OECF)		合計	%
		1999	2000	1999	2000	1999	2000		
第3者評価数		7	10	3	6	5	7	38	
評価 代表者	大学・研究 機関	5	4	1	1	2	2	15	39.5
	海外	0	0	0	0	1	3	4	10.5
	マスコミ	1	1	1	5	0	0	8	21.1
	財団法人・ コンサル	0	2	1	0	1	2	6	15.8
	その他	1	3	0	0	1	0	5	13.2

(注)内訳は評価代表者の所属を表す。大学機関：大学教官、海外：現地大学教官、現地 NGO、

第三者援助機関職員、経済団体：経団連、マスコミ：新聞記者

(出所) 松岡・本田（2001）を基に修正。

表4 ODA 評価における第3者評価 (2005 年度-2007 年度)

		外務省			JICA			JBIC(OECF)			合計	%
		'05	'06	'07	'05	'06	'07	'05	'06	'07		
第3者評価数		20	25	14	20	8	8	65	69	56	285	
評価 代表者	大学・ 研究機関	5	6	5	0	0	1	6	15	10	48	16.8
	法人	8	9	7	5	4	3	59	54	42	191	67.0
	海外	3	7	0	15	3	4	0	0	3	35	12.3
	マスコミ	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0.7
	その他	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	2.1

(注)%は、第二小数点を四捨五入。外務省は、1 事業について専門委員＋コンサルというパターンなので、各々数えた。

(出所)各評価報告書より松岡研・池田作成。

表 5 JBIC・円借款事業評価のレーティング結果（2008 年度・2009 年度）

（単位：件数）

年度	評価	妥当性	有効性	効率性	持続性	総合評価
2008	a	40(100%)	31(77.5%)	10(25%)	23(57.5%)	A 20(50%) B 14(35%) C 4 (10%) D 2 (5%) N/A 0(0%)
	b	0(0%)	7(17.5%)	25(62.5%)	17(42.5%)	
	c	0(0%)	2(5%)	5(12.5%)	0(0%)	
	N/A	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	0(0%)	
計(件)	—	40	40	40	40	40
2009	a	51(98.1%)	36(69.2%)	4(7.7%)	22(42.3%)	A 17(32.7%) B 22(42.3%) C 11(21.2%) D 1(1.9%) N/A 1(1.9%)
	b	0(0%)	15(28.8%)	43(82.7%)	26(50.0%)	
	c	0(0%)	0(0%)	4(7.7%)	3(5.8%)	
	N/A	1(1.9%)	1(1.9%)	1(1.9%)	1(1.9%)	
計(件)	—	52	52	52	52	52

（出所）JICA 事業報告書各年度版より松岡研・池田作成。

表 6 外務省「国別評価」の枠組み

評価の視点	具体的な評価指標	評価項目（例）
政策の妥当性	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>・ 国別援助方針はその上位概念である ODA 大綱及び ODA の中期政策やインドの開発ニーズに合致しているか</li> <li>・ 他ドナーの援助政策とわが国の国別援助方針の比較</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>・ ODA 大綱・ODA 中期政策との整合性</li> <li>・ 被援助国の開発ニーズとの関連度合い</li> </ul>
結果の有効性	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>・ 過去 5 年間にどのような実績があったのかをインプット及びアウトプットベースで検証する。</li> <li>・ 可能ならば、これらのアウトプットが重点分野毎の主要指標にどのような影響を与えたのかについて検証する。</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>・ 重点分野ごとのインプットおよびアウトプット実績</li> <li>・ 重点分野毎の主要指標への影響</li> </ul>
プロセスの適切性	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>・ 国別援助方針の策定及び実施プロセスに我が国 ODA の上位政策（大綱・中期政策）に書かれている留意事項が反映されているか。</li> <li>・ 相手国のニーズを把握し、国別援助方針を適切に策定・実行し、それを検証するような取り組みが行われているか。</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>・ 援助政策策定プロセスにおける協議の有無</li> <li>・ 援助実施のプロセスにおける連携・協議の有無</li> <li>・ 検証システムの有無</li> </ul>

（注）国別援助計画は、現在、32 カ国の計画がある。

（出所）外務省「ODA 評価ガイドライン（2009）」より松岡研・池田作成。

## 2. 世界の ODA 評価

- (1) Easterly, W. (2007), Are aid agencies improving?, *Economic Policy*, October 2007, pp.633-678

There is a long debate about how effective is foreign aid at creating economic development and eliminating poverty, going back to Rostow (1960), Chenery and Strout (1966), Bauer (1972), Cassen (1987), World Bank (1998), the UN Millennium Project (2005a), Sachs (2005), and Easterly (2006).

### **Table 1. Chronic problems in aid, past and present**

This paper takes a different tack – it adopts as the benchmark what the aid agencies (and consultants to the aid agencies) themselves state to be desirable behaviour. The paper is thus investigating the gap between what aid agencies say would be good behaviour and the way they actually behave; ‘progress’ is defined as closing this gap.

Learning could come at least from three sources: (1) cumulative experience at dealing with some of the chronic problems of foreign aid, (2) reacting to new knowledge in economic research, and (3) reacting to failure. The paper will analyse changes in response to experience to analyse (1), and draw on well-defined episodes of new knowledge and failure to analyse (2) and (3).

the World Bank (International Development Association or IDA for aid), the US, UK, France and Japan

## **2. LEARNING TO RESOLVE CHRONIC PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN AID**

### **2.1. Donor coordination**

**Figure 1. Is there decreasing fragmentation in aid giving?**

### **2.2. Aid tying**

**Figure 2. The decrease in aid tying**

### **2.3. Food aid and technical assistance**

**Figure 3. Is there a shift away from food aid and technical assistance?**

## **3. LEARNING NEW THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT**

The new approaches in the 1980s suggested that individual projects would have high returns only if national government policies were favorable, and then beginning in the 1990s only if institutions were supportive.

the World Bank’s Assessing Aid in 1998

How much did aid agencies learn from these new waves of thinking about development? How is such learning reflected in their behaviour? It is indisputable that the aid agencies gave different advice to poor countries based on progress in development economics, and so in this respect at least there was definitely learning.

### **3.1. Responding to need**

With the US, the post-Cold War expectations are confirmed, while for IDA and the other donors they are not.

### **3.2. Importance of government policies**

The overall picture is that there is little evidence that donors are learning to be increasingly selective with respect to policies in the recipient countries.

### **3.3. Importance of institutions**

The bottom line is that there is evidence for some sensitivity to corruption, but there is no evidence for learning by the aid agencies in response to new emphases in the literature about corruption.

**Table 10. Results of selectivity tests differentiated by donor**

## **4. LEARNING FROM FAILURE**

### **4.1. Structural adjustment**

Despite the accumulating evidence of failure and the problem of repetition, very little change in structural adjustment lending happened from 1980 to 1999. Finally, in 1999 the IMF and World Bank changed the name of the SALs for low-income countries to Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGFs) for the IMF and Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) for the World Bank. This did not explicitly address the repetition problem; instead, it was advertised at the time as a shift towards more emphasis on poverty reduction, which apparently was a reaction to the criticism that adjustment programmes did not try hard enough to protect the poorest part of the population.

#### **4.2. Debt relief**

The cycle of repeated adjustment lending, repeated debt relief, and over-optimism on growth rates in recent years does not seem to promise any escape from the aid syndrome noted way back in 1972 by P.T. Bauer: 'Concessionary finance used unproductively leads to indebtedness which is then used as an argument for further concessionary finance.' Here, there seems to be some combination of political pressure and lack of perspective that prevents any real learning to be implemented in escaping the debt cycle.

### **5. CONCLUSIONS**

The record of the aid agencies over time seems to indicate weak evidence of progress due to learning or changes in political support for poverty alleviation. The positive results are an increased sensitivity to per capita income of the recipient (although it happened long ago in the 1970s), a decline in aid tying, and decrease in food aid as a share of total aid. Most of the other evidence – increasing donor fragmentation, unchanged emphasis on technical assistance, little or no sign of increased selectivity with respect to policies and institutions, the adjustment lending-debt relief imbroglio – suggests an unchanged status quo, lack of response to new knowledge, and repetition of past mistakes.

( 2 ) **Easterly, W. and T. Pfutze (2008), “Where does the money go? Best and worst Practices in Foreign Aid”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2), pp.29-52**

Research question and analytical methodology

Comparisons of these aid agencies, Best practice for an ideal aid agency: Transparency, Specialization, Selectivity, Ineffective aid channel, Overhead cost

Four main findings

- First, the data on aid agency spending are inexcusably poor.
- Second, the international aid effort is remarkably fragmented along many dimensions.
- Third, aid practices like money going to corrupt autocrats and aid spent through ineffective channels like tied aid, food aid, and technical assistance also continue to be a problem despite decades of criticism.
- Fourth, using the admittedly limited information that we have, we provide rankings of aid agencies on both transparency and different characteristics of aid practice—and one final comprehensive ranking. We find considerable variation among aid agencies in their compliance with best practices. In general, multilateral development banks (except the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or EBRD) rated the best, and UN agencies the worst, with bilateral agencies strung out in between.

#### **What Would An Ideal Aid Agency Look Like?**

Principal-agent theory

Domestic government bureaucracies in democratic countries have some incentive to deliver their services to the intended beneficiaries, because the ultimate beneficiaries are also voters who can influence the budget and survival of the bureaucracy through their elected politicians.

However, the peculiar situation of the aid bureaucracies is that the intended beneficiaries of their actions—the poor people of the world—have no political voice to influence the behavior of the bureaucracy.

To remedy the feedback problem, a plausible partial solution is to make the operations of the aid agency as transparent as possible, so that any voters of high-income countries who care about the poor intended beneficiaries could pass judgment on what it does.

→Transparency, Specialization, Selectivity, Ineffective aid channel, Overhead cost

Dollar and Levin (2004) rank 41 bilateral and multilateral donors with respect to a “policy selectivity index”.

Acharya, de Lima, and Moore (2004) produce an index for the fragmentation of bilateral aid for a number of donor countries.

the Commitment to Development Index (CDI), which is produced by the Center for Global Development and *Foreign Policy* magazine.

## Aid Agencies and Transparency

Operating costs

1) permanent international staff, 2) consultants, 3) and local staff. For their permanent international staff we looked for a breakdown into 4) professional and support staff, 5) nationals of industrialized and developing countries, and 6) staff employed at headquarters and field offices. We also looked for data on 7) total administrative expenses, 8) expenses on salaries and benefits, and 9) the total amount of development assistance disbursed

We gave one point if the number was found on the agency’s website. If the number was provided after we inquired by e-mail, half a point was given and the overall score consists of the average points scored.

**Table 2 Transparency Indices for Bilateral and Multilateral Agencies**

## Aid Practices

4 基準

Specialization/fragmentation,

Selectivity,

Ineffective aid channels,

Overhead costs

Specialization/fragmentation:

1) from the same donor for all net official development assistance, 2) to the same country for any given donor, or 3) to the same sector for any given donor. All these probabilities are less than 10 percent: 9.6 percent in the first case, 4.6 percent in the second case, and 8.6 percent in the third case. In other words, the aid effort is splintered among many different donors, each agency’s aid effort is splintered among many different countries, and each agency’s aid effort is also splintered among many different sectors.

Selectivity:

Aid Going to Corrupt or Autocratic Countries versus Aid Going to Poor Countries

Composite Selectivity Score  $\_ .25 \times \text{Percentile Rank}(\text{Share NOT Going to Corrupt Countries}) \_ .25 \times \text{Percentile Rank}(\text{Share Going to Free Countries}) \_ .5 \times \text{Percentile Rank}(\text{Share Going to Low-Income Countries})$

### **Table 3 Aid Shares of Different Categories of Recipients in 2004**

UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East)

### **Ineffective Aid Channels**

Three types of aid are widely considered to be intrinsically not very effective: tied aid, food aid, and technical assistance.

### **Overhead Costs**

#### **Table 4 Overhead Cost Indicators Bilateral Donors**

### **Differences among Aid Agencies in Performance**

#### **Table 5 Ranking of Donor Agencies on Best Practices in Aid**

#### **Table 6 Correlation of Aid Practices across Agencies**

This correlation confirms the intuition that more specialization should lead to lower overhead costs, and it also provides some reassurance that our data on these two indicators (especially the lower overhead) are not pure noise. The other indicators that are correlated in a significant manner are selectivity and “avoiding ineffective channels,” with a 0.47 coefficient, and “lower overhead” and transparency with 0.38. The latter result may come about because a bloated bureaucracy has an interest in keeping its doings opaque. Finally, there is one significant negative pairwise correlation, between specialization (concentration) and selectivity (– 0.29). This result may hold because donors that specialize in particular recipients for historical reasons (like colonial ties) pay little attention to their favored recipient’s corruption or autocracy.<sup>11</sup> The relationship between Portugal and Angola is a well-known example.

### **3. 参考文献**

松岡俊二・本田直子(2001),「ODA 事業評価における専門性と総合性 : DAC5 項目の具体化を中心に」,『国際開発研究 (国際開発学会誌)』, 10(2), pp.49-70.

松岡俊二・池田れい (2010) ,「日本の ODA 評価の 10 年」(共通論題・招待報告) ,『日本評価学会 2010 年春季大会要旨集』(2010 年 6 月 19 日,政策研究大学院大学) , pp.89-92.

### **4. 講義日程**

#### **第 1 部 持続可能な発展 (SD) の概念と理論**

1. ガイダンス : 持続可能な発展とは? 4/07
2. 開発と環境 : 環境クズネツ曲線 (EKC) 4/14
3. 持続可能性の理論 (MSY・MEY、コモンズ理論) 4/21、4/28、5/12
4. 持続可能な発展の指標 (SDI) 5/19

#### **第 2 部 途上国の開発政策と持続可能な発展**

5. 途上国の貧困と開発 5/19
6. 途上国の開発政策 5/26
7. 途上国の開発と環境 6/02

#### **第 3 部 国際開発援助と持続可能な発展**

8. 国際開発援助の歴史と制度 6/09
- 9-12. 開発援助政策の理論と評価 6/16、6/23 (休講)、6/30、7/07

#### **第 4 部 新たな開発戦略**

13. 開発協力と地球環境問題 7/14
- 14-15. まとめと試験 7/21 (試験)、7/28 (まとめ、補講予定)

Table 5

## Ranking of Donor Agencies on Best Practices in Aid

Donor	Rank of average rank	Average percentile ranking on each type of aid best practice (higher rank means better aid practice)					Average percent rank
		Fragmentation	Selectivity	Ineffective channels	Overhead	Transparency	
IDA	1	51%	76%	87%	71%	100%	77%
United Kingdom	2	54%	72%	61%	76%	95%	72%
African Dev. Bank	3	49%	84%	87%	45%	90%	71%
Asian Dev. Bank	4	76%	46%	87%	48%	95%	70%
IDB	4	88%	41%	84%	56%	82%	70%
Norway	6	34%	38%	71%	97%	69%	62%
Sweden	7	39%	39%	74%	63%	90%	61%
Japan	8	61%	48%	42%	86%	62%	60%
Switzerland	9	63%	53%	81%	49%	51%	59%
Portugal	9	100%	50%	35%	86%	23%	59%
France	9	73%	53%	26%	62%	79%	59%
Australia	12	80%	45%	3%	79%	82%	58%
UNICEF	13	71%	57%	87%	32%	26%	55%
Belgium	14	83%	46%	32%	29%	74%	53%
Italy	15	46%	34%	16%	98%	49%	49%
United States	16	66%	20%	0%	59%	87%	46%
Austria	16	78%	39%	13%	35%	67%	46%
Ireland	16	59%	53%	77%		41%	46%
Nordic DF	16	56%	88%		79%	5%	46%
Netherlands	20	15%	56%	55%	37%	64%	45%
Canada	21	20%	61%	19%	45%	77%	44%
Denmark	21	44%	52%	52%	16%	56%	44%
Finland	23	24%	33%	39%	70%	38%	41%
Luxembourg	24	37%	70%	48%	37%	10%	40%
UNRWA	25	98%	23%		59%	13%	39%
IMF SAF & ESAF*	26	85%	70%		9%	26%	38%
Germany	27	27%	46%	29%	17%	59%	36%
CariBank	28	90%	49%		25%	13%	35%
EC	29	22%	47%	58%		36%	33%
EBRD	30	68%	41%		31%	13%	31%
GREECE	31	93%	7%	6%		41%	29%
UNDP	32	5%	60%		2%	72%	28%
SPAIN	33	32%	50%	10%		41%	27%
NEW ZEALAND	34	41%	40%	23%		26%	26%
UNFPA	35	2%	54%	45%	11%	3%	23%
IFAD (UN)	36	7%	69%		19%	5%	20%
WFP (UN)	37	10%	55%	0%	0%	26%	18%
GEF	37	29%	51%		9%	0%	18%
UNHCR	37	17%	53%		5%	13%	18%

Note: Duplicate numbers occur in the rankings when two or more countries have the same score and “tie” for some rank; this also explains missing ranks, for instance, no 5<sup>th</sup> place.

\* Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).