

Sustainable Development and International Development Cooperation No. 12

Part 3: Theory and Practice of International Cooperation

Assessing Aid and environment

OECD/DAC 5 Evaluation Principle

Effectiveness

Efficiency

Impact

Sustainability

Relevance

1. Easterly, W. (2007), Are aid agencies improving?, *Economic Policy*, October 2007, pp.633-678

There is a long debate about how effective is foreign aid at creating economic development and eliminating poverty, going back to Rostow (1960), Chenery and Strout (1966), Bauer (1972), Cassen (1987), World Bank (1998), the UN Millennium Project (2005a), Sachs (2005), and Easterly (2006).

Table 1

This paper takes a different tack – it adopts as the benchmark what the aid agencies (and consultants to the aid agencies) themselves state to be desirable behaviour. The paper is thus investigating the gap between what aid agencies say would be good behaviour and the way they actually behave; ‘progress’ is defined as closing this gap.

Learning could come at least from three sources: (1) cumulative experience at dealing with some of the chronic problems of foreign aid, (2) reacting to new knowledge in economic research, and (3) reacting to failure. The paper will analyse changes in response to experience to analyse (1), and draw on well-defined episodes of new knowledge and failure to analyse (2) and (3).

Table 1. Chronic problems in aid, past and present

Aid problem or idea	Pearson Commission (1969)	Contemporary statements (2005–2006)
More aid to poorest countries	‘IDA [International Development Association of the World Bank] has decided to make a special effort to assist the poorest members in project preparation so that they can benefit more fully from IDA financial assistance’ (p. 226). ^a	The Commission for Africa (2005, p. 99) calls for ‘allocating aid to countries where poverty is deepest’.
Donor coordination is a problem	‘the present multiplicity of agencies and their lack of coordination leads to much unnecessary duplication of effort’ (p. 228).	UNDP (2005): ‘weakly coordinated donors, many of them operating overlapping programmes’.
Be selective about to whom you give aid	‘increased allocation of aid should be primarily linked to performance’ (p. 133).	IMF and World Bank (2005, p. 168): ‘Broad consensus has emerged that development assistance is particularly effective in poor countries with sound policy and institutional environments.’
Aid tying is a problem	‘aid-tying imposes many different costs on aid-receiving countries . . . [costs] frequently exceed 20 per cent’ (p. 172); the donors should ‘consider the progressive untying of bilateral and multilateral aid’ (p. 189).	The IMF and World Bank (2005, p. 172): ‘Untying of aid significantly increases its effectiveness’ and ‘donors agreed to continue to make progress on untying aid’ (p. 173). UNDP (2005, p. 102) notes ‘price comparisons have found that tied aid reduces the value of assistance by 11%–30%’.
Move away from Food Aid	‘one of the most conspicuous forms of tying aid has been food aid . . . it has sometimes also allowed some low-income countries to neglect agricultural policy’ (p. 175).	The IMF and World Bank (2006b, p. 83): ‘transfer of food in kind was found to be about 50 percent more costly than locally procured food and 33 percent more costly than food imports from a third country’.
Technical assistance is a problem	‘technical assistance often develops a life of its own, little related in either donor or recipient countries to national or global development objectives’ (p. 180).	The IMF and World Bank (2006b): technical assistance ‘is often badly coordinated among donors and poorly prioritized’.
Debt relief	‘There has already been a sequence of debt crises . . . debt service problems of low income countries will become more severe’ (p. 72). ‘We recommend that debt relief avoid the need for repeated reschedulings’ (p. 157).	Commission for Africa (2005, p. 328): ‘For poor countries in sub-Saharan Africa which need it, the objective must be 100 per cent debt cancellation as soon as possible . . . the relief provided under [recent initiatives] has not been wide enough, or deep enough’.

^a IDA is the pure ‘aid’ part of the World Bank. It was set up in 1960 to provide highly concessional loans to the poorest countries. The rest of World Bank lending is not considered aid, since it is loans at market interest rates to middle income countries.

2. LEARNING TO RESOLVE CHRONIC PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN AID

2.1. Donor coordination




Figure 1. Is there decreasing fragmentation in aid giving?

Notes: Donor index is median for 15 bilateral donors, it is $1 - \text{Herfindahl}$ for recipient country shares of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) in donor's total. Recipient Index is $1 - \text{Herfindahl}$ for shares of donors' ODA in recipient country total ODA.

Source: OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC) database. Recipient sample is 103 countries with complete data from 1970 to 2003. Africa sample is 42 countries with complete data over the same period.

2.2. Aid tying




Figure 2. The decrease in aid tying

Source: OECD (various years), Development Assistance Committee, Tying Status of Bilateral Official Development Assistance Commitments (Table 7b).

2.3. Food aid and technical assistance

Figure 3. Is there a shift away from food aid and technical assistance?




Figure 3. Is there a shift away from food aid and technical assistance?

3. LEARNING NEW THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT

The new approaches in the 1980s suggested that individual projects would have high returns only if national government policies were favorable, and then beginning in the 1990s only if institutions were supportive.

the World Bank's Assessing Aid in 1998

How much did aid agencies learn from these new waves of thinking about development? How is such learning reflected in their behaviour? It is indisputable that the aid agencies gave different advice to poor countries based on progress in development economics, and so in this respect at least there was definitely learning.

3.1. Responding to need

With the US, the post-Cold War expectations are confirmed, while for IDA and the other donors they are not.

3.2. Importance of government policies

The overall picture is that there is little evidence that donors are learning to be increasingly selective with respect to policies in the recipient countries.

3.3. Importance of institutions

The bottom line is that there is evidence for some sensitivity to corruption, but there is no evidence for learning by the aid agencies in response to new emphases in the literature about corruption.

Table 10. Results of selectivity tests differentiated by donor

Exogenous event	Donor most affected	Prediction of shift	Increased sensitivity to:	Predicted effect on donor most affected?	Predicted effect on all donors?
World Bank president McNamara initiative towards emphasizing poverty more, 1973	World Bank (IDA)	One-time shift	Need	Yes	Yes
Increased emphasis on policies after 1980	World Bank (IDA) because of structural adjustment lending	One-time shift	Inflation Openness	No No	No No
End of Cold War, 1990	USA	One-time shift	Need Democracy Corruption	Yes No No	No No No
Increased awareness of corruption, World Bank President Wolfensohn speech, 1996	World Bank (IDA)	One-time shift	Corruption	No	No
Steadily increasing selectivity with respect to need, policies, institutions	UK	Trend	Need	No	Yes
			Inflation	No	No
			Openness	No	No
			Democracy	No	No
			Corruption	No	No
	France	Trend	Need	No	
			Inflation	No	
			Openness	No	
			Democracy	Yes	
			Corruption	No	
	Japan	Trend	Need	No	
			Inflation	No	
			Openness	No	
			Democracy	No	
			Corruption	Yes	

4. LEARNING FROM FAILURE

4.1. Structural adjustment

Despite the accumulating evidence of failure and the problem of repetition, very little change in structural adjustment lending happened from 1980 to 1999. Finally, in 1999 the IMF and World Bank changed the name of the SALs for low-income countries to Poverty Reduction and Growth Facilities (PRGFs) for the IMF and Poverty Reduction Support Credits (PRSCs) for the World Bank. This did not explicitly address the repetition problem; instead, it was advertised at the time as a shift towards more emphasis on poverty reduction, which apparently was a reaction to the criticism that adjustment programmes did not try hard enough to protect the poorest part of the population.

4.2. Debt relief

The cycle of repeated adjustment lending, repeated debt relief, and over-optimism on growth rates in recent years does not seem to promise any escape from the aid syndrome noted way back in 1972 by P.T. Bauer: ‘Concessionary finance used unproductively leads to indebtedness which is then used as an argument for further concessionary finance.’ Here, there seems to be some combination of political pressure and lack of perspective that prevents any real learning to be implemented in escaping the debt cycle.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The record of the aid agencies over time seems to indicate weak evidence of progress due to learning or changes in political support for poverty alleviation. The positive results are an increased sensitivity to per capita income of the recipient (although it happened long ago in the 1970s), a decline in aid tying, and decrease in food aid as a share of total aid. Most of the other evidence – increasing donor fragmentation, unchanged emphasis on technical assistance, little or no sign of increased selectivity with respect to policies and institutions, the adjustment lending-debt relief imbroglio – suggests an unchanged status quo, lack of response to new knowledge, and repetition of past mistakes.

2. Easterly, W. and T. Pfutze (2008), “Where does the money go? Best and worst Practices in Foreign Aid”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2), pp.29-52

Research question and analytical methodology

Comparisons of these aid agencies, Best practice for an ideal aid agency: Transparency, Specialization, Selectivity, Ineffective aid channel, Overhead cost

Four main findings

- First, the data on aid agency spending are inexcusably poor.
- Second, the international aid effort is remarkably fragmented along many dimensions.
- Third, aid practices like money going to corrupt autocrats and aid spent through ineffective channels like tied aid, food aid, and technical assistance also continue to be a problem despite decades of criticism.
- Fourth, using the admittedly limited information that we have, we provide rankings of aid agencies on both transparency and different characteristics of aid practice—and one final comprehensive ranking. We find considerable variation among aid agencies in their compliance with best practices. In general, multilateral development banks (except the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or EBRD) rated the best, and UN agencies the worst, with bilateral agencies strung out in between.

What Would An Ideal Aid Agency Look Like?

Principal–agent theory

Domestic government bureaucracies in democratic countries have some incentive to deliver their services to the intended beneficiaries, because the ultimate beneficiaries are also voters who can influence the budget and survival of the bureaucracy through their elected politicians.

However, the peculiar situation of the aid bureaucracies is that the intended beneficiaries of their actions—the poor people of the world—have no political voice to influence the behavior of the bureaucracy.

To remedy the feedback problem, a plausible partial solution is to make the operations of the aid agency as transparent as possible, so that any voters of high-income countries who care about the poor intended beneficiaries could pass judgment on what it does.

→Transparency, Specialization, Selectivity, Ineffective aid channel, Overhead cost

Dollar and Levin (2004) rank 41 bilateral and multilateral donors with respect to a “policy selectivity index”.

Acharya, de Lima, and Moore (2004) produce an index for the fragmentation of bilateral aid for a number of donor countries.

the Commitment to Development Index (CDI), which is produced by the Center for Global Development and *Foreign Policy* magazine.

Aid Agencies and Transparency

Operating costs

1) permanent international staff, 2) consultants, 3) and local staff. For their permanent international staff we looked for a breakdown into 4) professional and support staff, 5) nationals of industrialized and developing countries, and 6) staff employed at headquarters and field offices. We also looked for data on 7) total administrative expenses, 8) expenses on salaries and benefits, and 9) the total amount of development assistance disbursed

We gave one point if the number was found on the agency’s website. If the number was provided after we inquired by e-mail, half a point was given and the overall score consists of the average points scored.

Table 2 Transparency Indices for Bilateral and Multilateral Agencies

Aid Practices

Specialization/fragmentation, Selectivity, Ineffective aid channels, and Overhead costs.

Specialization/fragmentation

1) from the same donor for all net official development assistance, 2) to the same country for any given donor, or 3) to the same sector for any given donor. All these probabilities are less than 10 percent: 9.6 percent in the first case, 4.6 percent in the second case, and 8.6 percent in the third case. In other words, the aid effort is splintered among many different donors, each agency’s aid effort is splintered among many different countries, and each agency’s aid effort is also splintered among many different sectors.

Selectivity: Aid Going to Corrupt or Autocratic Countries versus Aid Going to Poor Countries

Composite Selectivity Score $_{.25 \times \text{Percentile Rank}(\text{Share NOT Going to Corrupt Countries})_{.25 \times \text{Percentile Rank}(\text{Share Going to Free Countries})_{.5 \times \text{Percentile Rank}(\text{Share Going to Low-Income Countries})}$

Table 3 Aid Shares of Different Categories of Recipients in 2004

UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East)

Table 2

Transparency Indices for Bilateral and Multilateral Agencies

(ranked by average score for each type, where the average is calculated over the first two columns)

Donor	Transparency index based on		Average (of columns 3 and 4)	Rank
	Operating costs	OECD reporting		
Bilateral agencies (reported by country)				
Australia	0.56	1.00	0.78	7
Austria	0.50	0.80	0.65	14
Belgium	0.49	1.00	0.75	11
Canada	0.50	1.00	0.75	10
Denmark	0.22	1.00	0.61	18
Finland	0.50	0.60	0.55	25
France	0.51	1.00	0.75	9
Germany	0.27	1.00	0.63	17
Greece	0.11	1.00	0.56	22
Ireland	0.11	1.00	0.56	22
Italy	0.39	0.80	0.59	21
Japan	0.27	1.00	0.64	16
Luxemburg	0.22	0.60	0.41	36
Netherlands	0.28	1.00	0.64	15
New Zealand	0.00	1.00	0.50	27
Norway	0.39	1.00	0.69	13
Portugal	0.11	0.80	0.46	31
Spain	0.11	1.00	0.56	22
Sweden	0.67	1.00	0.83	4
Switzerland	0.41	0.80	0.60	20
United Kingdom	0.72	1.00	0.86	2
United States	0.78	0.80	0.79	6
European Commission	0.22	0.80	0.51	26
Multilateral agencies				
African Dev. Bank	0.67	1.00	0.83	4
Asian Dev. Bank	0.72	1.00	0.86	2
CariBank	0.56	0.33	0.44	32
EBRD	0.56	0.33	0.44	32
GEF	0.11	0.33	0.22	40
IBRD	0.89	0.33	0.61	18
IDA	0.89	1.00	0.94	1
IDB	0.56	1.00	0.78	7
IFAD (UN)	0.44	0.33	0.39	37
IMF	0.67	0.33	0.50	27
Nordic DF	0.44	0.33	0.39	37
UNDP	0.44	1.00	0.72	12
UNFPA	0.28	0.33	0.31	39
UNHCR	0.56	0.33	0.44	32
UNICEF	0.33	0.67	0.50	27
UNRWA	0.56	0.33	0.44	32
WFP (UN)	0.67	0.33	0.50	27

Note: Duplicate numbers in the rankings occur when two or more countries have the same score and "tie" for some rank; this also explains missing ranks, for instance the absence of a 3rd place.

Table 3

Aid Shares of Different Categories of Recipients in 2004

Donor	Rank composite score	Share of aid going to:			
		Corrupt countries	Part-free or unfree countries	Least developed countries	Other low income
Nordic Development Fund	1	52%	72%	60%	28%
African Dev. Bank	2	63%	77%	83%	14%
IDA	3	66%	79%	50%	40%
United Kingdom	4	65%	77%	51%	30%
Luxembourg	5	60%	55%	51%	19%
IMF SAF & ESAF*	6	56%	94%	58%	38%
IFAD (UN)	7	66%	76%	53%	24%
Canada	8	66%	76%	47%	22%
UNDP	9	70%	83%	60%	24%
UNICEF	10	72%	83%	54%	29%
Netherlands	11	66%	75%	42%	23%
WFP (UN)	12	70%	89%	70%	16%
UNFPA	13	68%	79%	48%	24%
Ireland	14	80%	87%	80%	7%
Switzerland	14	67%	74%	40%	25%
France	16	51%	78%	47%	16%
UNHCR	17	66%	86%	49%	23%
Denmark	18	73%	81%	52%	25%
Portugal	19	100%	94%	97%	0%
GEF	19	51%	21%	15%	13%
Spain	21	41%	76%	14%	20%
CariBank	22	35%	0%	0%	0%
Japan	23	66%	65%	15%	31%
European Commission	24	65%	77%	41%	13%
Asian Dev. Bank	25	83%	95%	30%	56%
Germany	25	62%	79%	23%	33%
Belgium	27	78%	85%	64%	12%
Australia	28	93%	86%	32%	46%
IDB	29	27%	81%	6%	27%
EBRD	30	95%	74%	0%	64%
New Zealand	31	88%	77%	46%	19%
Sweden	32	73%	86%	52%	16%
Austria	33	72%	78%	18%	40%
Norway	34	76%	88%	59%	11%
Italy	35	62%	88%	36%	11%
Finland	36	78%	80%	47%	16%
UNRWA	37	49%	100%	0%	0%
United States	38	76%	87%	29%	12%
Greece	39	92%	91%	8%	8%
Average		68%	78%	42%	22%
Standard deviation		16%	18%	23%	14%
Median		66%	79%	47%	22%
Max		100%	100%	97%	64%
Min		27%	0%	0%	0%

* Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).

Ineffective Aid Channels

Three types of aid are widely considered to be intrinsically not very effective: tied aid, food aid, and technical assistance.

Overhead Costs

Table 4 Overhead Cost Indicators Bilateral Donors

Table 4

Overhead Cost Indicators Bilateral Donors

<i>Agencies</i>	<i>Rank of overall score</i>	<i>Ratio administrative budget to ODF</i>	<i>Ratio salaries and benefits to ODF</i>	<i>Total ODF million \$ per permanent international employee</i>	<i>Total ODF million \$ per employee</i>
Bilaterals agencies (reported by country)					
Italy	1	1%	0%	\$11.02	\$8.11
Norway	2	1%		\$10.81	\$10.81
Portugal	4			\$5.35	\$5.35
Japan	5	2%	1%	\$4.38	\$4.38
Australia	6	2%	2%	\$3.34	\$3.34
UK	8	5%	2%	\$3.84	\$3.84
Finland	10	4%		\$2.55	\$2.35
Sweden	11		4%	\$2.41	\$2.41
France	12		6%	\$3.02	\$3.02
USA	13	11%	3%	\$4.39	\$1.30
Switzerland	16		6%	\$1.65	\$1.65
Canada	19	9%	6%	\$1.06	\$1.06
Luxembourg	20			\$1.14	\$1.14
Netherlands	21	19%		\$1.36	\$1.36
Austria	22	12%	7%	\$0.63	\$0.63
Belgium	25		8%	\$0.62	\$0.62
Germany	28			\$0.48	\$0.48
Denmark	29			\$0.60	\$0.29
All bilateral		7%	2%	\$2.73	\$1.37
Multilaterals					
Nordic DF	7	6%	4%	\$6.75	\$6.75
IBRD&IDA (World Bank)	9	7%	3%	\$5.50	\$1.93
UNRWA	14		52%	\$4.58	\$4.58
IDB	15	11%		\$2.33	\$2.33
Asian Dev. Bank	17	8%	8%	\$1.45	\$1.45
African Dev. Bank	18	12%	9%	\$1.93	\$1.93
UNICEF	23	14%			
EBRD	24	15%		\$1.37	\$0.53
CariBank	26	26%	10%	\$1.24	\$0.61
IFAD (UN)	27	22%	16%	\$0.56	\$0.56
UNFPA	30			\$0.32	\$0.32
IMF	31	75%	53%	\$0.46	\$0.40
GEF	32	75%			
UNHCR	33			\$0.08	\$0.07
UNDP	34	129%	100%	\$0.19	\$0.05
WFP (UN)	35			\$0.03	\$0.03
all multilateral		12%	8%	\$1.12	\$0.68
all aid		9%	5%	\$1.72	\$0.97

Note: ODF is "official development financing," which is defined as the sum of official development assistance and nonconcessional official loans.

Differences among Aid Agencies in Performance

Table 5 Ranking of Donor Agencies on Best Practices in Aid

Table 6 Correlation of Aid Practices across Agencies

This correlation confirms the intuition that more specialization should lead to lower overhead costs, and it also provides some reassurance that our data on these two indicators (especially the lower overhead) are not pure noise. The other indicators that are correlated in a significant manner are

selectivity and “avoiding ineffective channels,” with a 0.47 coefficient, and “lower overhead” and transparency with 0.38. The latter result may come about because a bloated bureaucracy has an interest in keeping its doings opaque. Finally, there is one significant negative pairwise correlation, between specialization (concentration) and selectivity (– 0.29). This result may hold because donors that specialize in particular recipients for historical reasons (like colonial ties) pay little attention to their favored recipient’s corruption or autocracy.¹¹ The relationship between Portugal and Angola is a well-known example.

Table 5
Ranking of Donor Agencies on Best Practices in Aid

<i>Donor</i>	<i>Rank of average rank</i>	<i>Average percentile ranking on each type of aid best practice (higher rank means better aid practice)</i>					<i>Average percent rank</i>
		<i>Fragmentation</i>	<i>Selectivity</i>	<i>Ineffective channels</i>	<i>Overhead</i>	<i>Transparency</i>	
IDA	1	51%	76%	87%	71%	100%	77%
United Kingdom	2	54%	72%	61%	76%	95%	72%
African Dev. Bank	3	49%	84%	87%	45%	90%	71%
Asian Dev. Bank	4	76%	46%	87%	48%	95%	70%
IDB	4	88%	41%	84%	56%	82%	70%
Norway	6	34%	38%	71%	97%	69%	62%
Sweden	7	39%	39%	74%	63%	90%	61%
Japan	8	61%	48%	42%	86%	62%	60%
Switzerland	9	63%	53%	81%	49%	51%	59%
Portugal	9	100%	50%	35%	86%	23%	59%
France	9	73%	53%	26%	62%	79%	59%
Australia	12	80%	45%	3%	79%	82%	58%
UNICEF	13	71%	57%	87%	32%	26%	55%
Belgium	14	83%	46%	32%	29%	74%	53%
Italy	15	46%	34%	16%	98%	49%	49%
United States	16	66%	20%	0%	59%	87%	46%
Austria	16	78%	39%	13%	35%	67%	46%
Ireland	16	59%	53%	77%		41%	46%
Nordic DF	16	56%	88%		79%	5%	46%
Netherlands	20	15%	56%	55%	37%	64%	45%
Canada	21	20%	61%	19%	45%	77%	44%
Denmark	21	44%	52%	52%	16%	56%	44%
Finland	23	24%	33%	39%	70%	38%	41%
Luxembourg	24	37%	70%	48%	37%	10%	40%
UNRWA	25	98%	23%		59%	13%	39%
IMF SAF & ESAF*	26	85%	70%		9%	26%	38%
Germany	27	27%	46%	29%	17%	59%	36%
CariBank	28	90%	49%		25%	13%	35%
EC	29	22%	47%	58%		36%	33%
EBRD	30	68%	41%		31%	13%	31%
GREECE	31	93%	7%	6%		41%	29%
UNDP	32	5%	60%		2%	72%	28%
SPAIN	33	32%	50%	10%		41%	27%
NEW ZEALAND	34	41%	40%	23%		26%	26%
UNFPA	35	2%	54%	45%	11%	3%	23%
IFAD (UN)	36	7%	69%		19%	5%	20%
WFP (UN)	37	10%	55%	0%	0%	26%	18%
GEF	37	29%	51%		9%	0%	18%
UNHCR	37	17%	53%		5%	13%	18%

Note: Duplicate numbers occur in the rankings when two or more countries have the same score and “tie” for some rank; this also explains missing ranks, for instance, no 5th place.

* Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF).

Table 6
Correlation of Aid Practices Across Agencies
(Significant relationships at the 5 percent level shown in bold)

	<i>Specialization</i>	<i>Selectivity</i>	<i>Avoiding ineffective channels</i>	<i>Lower overhead</i>
Selectivity	-0.2914			
Avoiding ineffective aid channels	0.0376	0.4703		
Lower overhead	0.3702	-0.18	0.0713	
Transparency	0.1399	-0.0329	0.2259	0.3813

3. References

- Easterly, W. and T. Pfutze (2008), "Where does the money go? Best and worst Practices in Foreign Aid", *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 22(2), pp.29-52
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4. Schedule of Course Work

1. Introduction 9/27
- Part 1: History, Concept, and Theory of Sustainable Development (SD)*
2. History and concept of SD 10/6
3. Theory of SD: Carrying Capacity and MSY 10/13
4. Measuring and Indicators of SD 10/20
5. * Students make a short report and presentation about your definition and measuring of SD 10/27
- Part 2: Development and Environment in Developing Countries*
6. Development issues: Poverty Trap and Big push 11/10
7. Economy and society of developing countries: Dual society and two sector development model 11/17
8. Development strategy: import substitution and export oriented 11/24
9. Development strategy and environment 12/1
10. * Students make a short report and presentation about development issues in selected countries. 12/8
- Part 3: Theory and Practice of International Cooperation*
11. History and theory of international development cooperation 12/15
12. PRSP, MDGs, and Paris Declaration 12/22
13. Assessing Aid and environment 1/12
14. * Students make a short report and presentation about aid and development in selected cases. 1/19
- Part 4: Toward a Sustainable Global Society (governance)*
15. Sustainable global society, global governance and concluding remarks 1/26